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36 DEXTER t1. DEXTER [42 C.21l 
[L. A. No. 22499. In Bank. Jan. 8, 1954.] 
MARY DEXTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RAYMOND 
C. DEXTER, Defendant and Appellant. 
(1) Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se.-A husband and 
wife may contract with respect to thelT property (Civ. Code, 
1158), and if they are living separate and apart they may 
provide for su,?port and maintenance of either of them and 
their children. \ Civ. Code. ~ 159.) 
[2) Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-
Effect of Agreement of Parties.-As between husband and 
wife. if provisions In an agreement by them fer support /lnd 
maintenance have been made an integral or inseverable part 
of division of their p>"opert:v. and court in a divorce action has 
approved agreement.. its provisions cannot . thereafter be 
modified without consent of both parties. 
[3] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.- Where husband and wife enter lDto 
agreement prior· to divorce wherein they expressly state that 
they intend finally to settle both division of their property 
and thelT rights and duties with respect to support and main-
tenance, and each party waives "any and all right to support, 
care and maintenance" other "than as expressly provided for 
herein," the prOVIsion for monthly payments does Dot consti-
tute 8 separable agreement for payment of alimony subject 
to continning .jurisdietion of court to modify 
[4] Id, - Permanent Alimony - Effect ot Agreement of Parties: 
Modification of Allowance.- Where husband and wife have 
made a provision for support and maintenance an integral 
part of their property settlement agreement. the monthly pay-
ments will ordinarily have a dual character: to the extent 
that they are designed to discharge obligation of support and 
maintenance they will ordinarily have indicia of alimony. but 
to the extent that they represent a division of community 
property itself. or constitutt' an inseparable part of considera-
tion for propert:v settlement, they are Dot alimony and ac-
cordingly cannot be modified witbout changing terms of prop-
"rty settlement 8Jrl'eement. 
[lJ See (JaI.Jur., Husband and Wife, 144 et seq.: Am.Jur., 
Husband and Wife ~ 252 et seq. 
[21 See Am.Jur .. Divorce and Separation, § 643 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [11 Husband and Wife,§ 154; [2, 3, 5-8J 
Divorce, § 216(1); f 4) Divorce, §§ 203. 216; [9J Husband Ilnd 
Wife, ~ 157 (4); nO) iJivorce; §§ 216; 234(2) j [11] Divorce; § 203; 
[121 Divorce, § 179(3). 
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(5] IeL-Permanent Alimon,-Modification of Allowance-Eifeet 
of Agreement of Partiea.- Where provision in property spttlp· 
ment agreement for monthly payments was expressly mcor· 
porated in interlocutory divorce decree and busband ordered 
to perform It. but tbere bad been DO previoul adjudication 
tbat the monthlY pl_yments were alimony and Interlocutory 
decree itself did Dot purport to determine character of pay· 
ments, lucb proV1slon did Dot become merged in decree 80 aa 
to be subject to modification pursuant to Civ. Code. * 139. 
[6] Id.-Permanent Ahmony-ModiflcatioD of Allowance-Eifeet 
of Agreement of Partiea.-ln absence of aD order for pay· 
ment of alimony In mterlocutory decree, or a reservation of 
jurisdiction to make sucb an order in tbe future. court cannot. 
after interlocutory decree baa become final, add a provision 
for alimony or modify amount of payments ordered pursuant to 
a property settlement agreement. 
Id.-Permanent Altmon,-Modificationof Allowance-Eifect 
of Agreement of Parties. -If wife waa dissatisfied witb ber 
eontract wbereby sbe bad made support and maintenance pro-
visions aD lDtegral part of settlement of property rights and 
had tenable ground~ for 3etting it aside, she sbould bave at· 
• tacked agreement before lDterlocutory divorce decree waa 
entered; she cannot. after baving secured approval of agree-
ment by court and having accepted benefits thereof. seek relief 
inconsistent witb its terms 
IeL-Permanent Alimon,-Modiflcation of Allowance-Beet 
of Agreement of Partiea.-If wife agreed to accept less thaD 
her share of community pro.,el'ty in exchaDge for greater sup-
port aDd maintenance payments, it would be unjust to her 
eubsequently to bold that payments were alimony subject to 
reduction on bus band's motion. 
Husband and Wife--'l'ransaettons Inter Se-Property Settle-
mat Agreements-Consideration.-Since at time a property 
,.ttlement agreement is made, the parties may be uncertain 
.. to wbicb of their property is community rather thaD 
,aeparate. and they will ordinarily not know bow oourt ill 
, divorce action ..ul find the facts or how it would, in absence 
aD acceptable agreement, exercise its discretion ill dividing 
'property and awardiug alimony, the amicable adjustment of 
these doubtful questions with respect to property and sup-
,port and maintenance rights of the parties may alone supply 
su1ftcient consideration to support their entirp a~eement. 
Divorce-Permanent Alimon,-ModUication of Allowance: 
Disposition of Oommunity Pr\lperty.- Where plaintiff secured 
her divorce on ground of extreme cruelty, bad the parties not 
settled their rights by agreement. eourt eould in its discretion 
awarded plaintiff all of community property and 18l1li 
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38 DEXTER v. DEXTER [42 C.2d 
alimony than she received under her agreement, in which case 
the alimony would be subject to reduction in event of changed 
eircumstances. 
[11] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
Wife is entitled to agree to an equal division of community 
property in exchange for support and maintenance payment. 
that cannot be reduced; accordingly, the fact that community 
property is divided equally baa no bearing on validity of pro-
vision of agreement whereby both parties waive all rights to 
support and maintenance other than as provided therein. 
[12] ld.-Counsel Fees and Oosta-Peeling AppeaJ..-On hearing 
of divorced wife's petition for increase in amount of monthly 
payments provided for in property settlement agreement and 
awarded her by decree, trial court has jurisdiction to determine 
eharacter of payments involved; accordingly, divorce action is 
still pending within meaning of Civ. Code, § 137.3, 80 as to 
authorize court to order husband to pay wife's OOIIts and at-
torney fees on appeal 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County refusing divorced wife's petition to increase 
amount of monthly payments awarded her by judgment, and 
allowing attorney fees and costs on appeal. Louis H. Burke 
and Lewis Drucker,- Judges. Affirmed. 
Hightower &; Martin, Irving M. Walker, John L. Martin, 
and Mark Mullin for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Macfarlane, Schaefer &; naun and William Gamble for De-
fendant and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, J.--On May 25, 1944, plaintiff Mary Dexter 
and her husband, defendant Raymond Dexter, executed an 
agreement providing for the division of their community 
property and the support and maintenance of plaintiff and 
the children of the marriage. The agreement recited that 
the parties were separated and had lived apart for some time, 
that the separation appeared to be permanent, and that "The 
said parties desire to effect a division of their community 
property and to provide for the support and maintenance of 
[plaintiff] and said children by friendly agreement, instead 
of resorting to court for said purpose." It then provided 
that certain enumerated property should be conveyed to and 
become the separate property of plaintiff. The next para-
-.r1Mlae pro teal., uaipec1 b7 Chairman of oTuc1icia1 Counc.U. 
• c 
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graphs provided that" [Defendant] agrees to pay to [plain-
ti1fJ for her support and maintenance and the support of thrlir 
adult daughter and minor son, the sum of one hundred fifty 
dollars ($150.00) per month. • . • In addition thereto first 
party agrees to pay for the daughter's Sorority dues and other 
expenses the sum of twenty-five ($25.00) per month, com-
mencing June 1, 1944, and continuing thereafter so long as 
uid daughter remains an undergraduate in college, and un-
married, but not to exceed (2) years from June 1, 1944. 
"When the minor son of the parties hereto leaves school 
and goes to work, or when and if he goes into the military 
forces of the United States, then the monthly payment of 
[plainti1f] shall be decreased to one hundred dollars. . •. 
"In addition to the above amounts, [defendant) agrees, at 
his expense, to fix np the guest or maid's house at the premises 
above described, and to repair the fence on said property. 
"Upon the marriage of [plainti1f], all payments to her for 
. her support and maintenance shall cease, but the payments 
for the minor son and daughter shall continue on the terms 
hereinabove provided. Upon the death of [plainti1f], all 
payments hereunder shall cease and [defendant] will assume 
any obligation for the support of said children. 
" ( 4) All money and property of the parties hereto, other 
than that agreed to be conveyed to [plainti1fJ, shall be con-
veyed to [defendant], and shall become the separate property 
[defendant]. . . . 
" (6) Other than as expressly provided for herein, the 
IU~t:.ect;ive parties hereto do hereby release the other party 
respectively from any and all right of snpport, care 
maintenance, as the husband or wife, respectively, of the 
party. It is the intention of the parties hereto to make 
settlement herein of all rights of snpport, care and 
E,):nailntlenELDce, one against the other, and to release the other 
respectively from all rights of such support, care and 
.. ~:n&llnt,eDlm(~e other than as herein provided. • • • 
"(8) Neither party hereto waives any cause of action for 
~dliVo,rce which he or she, respectively, has against the other 
1Ii",A1'f" hereto . 
.. "In any action for divorce or maintenance hereafter bronght 
either party, [plainti1fJ waives any right to alimony, tem-
E''I'i;". .......... or permanent, other than such amount as is provided 
hereinabove for her support. 
[Defendant] assumes and agrees to pay all attorneys fees 
IIhned. bT the parties hereto in the execution of this acre. 
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ment and agrees to pay all court costs and reasonable counsel 
fees incurred by [plaintiff} in any action for divorce which 
she may file against [defendant.] U 
Shortly after this agreement was executed plaintiff filed an 
action for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. She 
attached the agreement to the complaint and prayed that it 
be approved. that defendant be directed to comply with it, 
and that alimony be awarded in accordance with its terms. 
Defendant defaulted and an interlocutory decree WAS entered. 
The decree approved the agreement. ordered defendant 
to comply with it. and provided that pursuant to its terms, 
"defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff' monthly the 
sum of $150.00. . commencing June 1, 1944: provided, 
however, that when the son Norman Greenaway Dexter, 
leaves school and goes to work. 01' when be goes into the 
military forces of the United States. the said monthly 
award shall be reduced to the sum of $100.00 per month. to 
The decree also expressly incorporated the provision with 
respect to the payment of $25 per month for the college ex-
penses of the adult daughter of the parties. A final decree 
was entered approximately one year later. In 1952 plaintiff 
petitioned the court to increase the amount of the monthly 
payments to $800 on the ground of cbanged circumstances. 
The court· entered its order refusing modification on the 
ground that it had no jurisdiction to modify the amount of 
the payments. Plaintiff appealed and secured an order for 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. and defendant appealed 
from the latter order. 
Plaintiff contends that the payments ordered to be made 
pursuant to the agreement are alimony subject to modification 
by the court under section 139 of the Civil Code. Defendant, 
on the other band. contends that they constitute an integral 
part of the property settlement agreement of the parties and 
are not. therefore. subject to modification. 
[1] A husband and wife may contract with respect to 
their property (Civ. Code. § 158), and if they are living sep-
arate and apart they may provide for the support and main-
tenance of either of them and their children. (Civ. Code, 
§ 159.) [2] Moreover. as between the husband and wife, 
if the provisions for support and maintenance have been made 
an integral or inseverable part of the division of their prop-
erty. and the court in a divorce action has approved the agree-
ment. its provisions cannot thereafter be modified without 
the consent of both of the parties. (Tum. v. Tum., 38 Cal. 
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2d 419, 420-422 [240 P.2d 587] ; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 
621, 625 [177 P.2d 265] ; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Ca1.2d 833, 
841-842 [136 P.2d 1] ; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 
175-178 [44 P.2d 540] ; SasanofJ v. SasarwfJ, 120 Cal.App.2d 
120, 127 (260 P.2d 840]; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal. 
App.2d 293, 299 [210 P.2d 750] ; Alexander v. Alexander, 88 
Cal.App.2d 724, 726-727 [199 P.2d 348] ; HoZZoway v. Hollo-
way, 79 Cal.App.2d 44, 46-47 [179 P.2d 22]; Kohl v. Kohl, 
66 Cal.App.2d 535, 540-541 [152 P.2d 494]; Landru v. Ros-
asco, 62 Cal.App.2d 99, 105-106 [144 P.2d 20] ; Rich v. Rick, 
44 Cal.App.2d 526,530 [112 P.2d 780].) 
[3] It is clear that the parties executed such an agreement 
in this case. They expressly stated that they intended finally 
to settle both the division of their property and their rights 
and duties with respect to support and maintenance, and each 
party waived "any and all right to support, care and main-
tenance" other "than as expressly provided for herein." It 
would be contrary to the clearly expressed intention of the 
parties to hold that the provision for monthly payments con-
stituted a separable agreement for the payment of alimony 
subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court to modify. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that since the monthly payments 
were to terminate on her death or remarriage and were de-
scribed as alimony in the prayer of her complaint, they should 
be 80 treated. She points out that if they were intended as 
· a division of property it would have been more reasonable for 
the agreement to provide that they should continue until a 
given amount had been paid. These considerations would be 
. more persuasive if the issue presented was whether, on the 
· one hand, the monthly payments were solely part of a division 
of the community property, or, on the other hand, soleiy 
· alimony. [4] When, as in this case, however, the parties 
have made the provision for support and maintenance an 
integral part of their property settlement agreement, the 
monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual character. To 
the extent that they are designed to discharge the obligation 
of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the 
characteristics of that obligation and thus have the indicia 
: of alimony. (See Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 838 
· [136 P.2d 1] ; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Ca1.2d 172, 174 [44 
· P.2d 540] ; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 537 [152 P.2d 
494J.) On the other hand, to the extent that they represent 
,division of the community property itself, or constitute an 
,~IePllU'aDJ.e part of the consideration for iH propezV .eitle-
) 
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ment, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modi-
fied without changing the terms of the property settlement 
agreement of the parties. 
[5] Plaintiff contends, however, that when the provision 
of the agreement for monthly payments was expressly incor-
porated into the interlocutory decree and defendant was or· 
dered to perform it, it became merged in the decree, and that 
therefore, under the rule stated in Hough v. Hough, 26 Ca1.2d 
605 [160 P.2d 15], it was subject to modification pursuant 
to section 139 of the Civil Code. In the Hough case, however, 
it had become res judicata that the payments there involved 
were alimony and not an integral part of a property settle-
ment. Accordingly, the court was not called upon to review 
the correctness of that determination, and it held that an agree· 
ment for alimony that had been merged in a divorce decree 
could no longer be enforced in an independent action. In the 
present ease, on the other hand, there has been no previous 
adjudication in modification proceedings that the monthly pay-
ments are alimony. Moreover, the interlocutory decree itself 
did not purport to determine the character of the payments. 
It merely ordered defendant to make them pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement and thus made clear that judgment 
remedies including contempt would be available for the en-
forcement of his obligations. 
[6] In the absence of an order for the payment of alimony 
in the interlocutory decree, such as the order that had been 
found to be present in the Hough case (see, also, Werner v. 
Werner, 120 Cal.App.2d 248, 249-252 [260 P.2d 961]; 
Dunning v. Dunning, 114 Cal.App.2d 110, 114 [249 P.2d 609] ; 
Pearman v. Peannan, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 253 [231 P.2d 101] ; 
Weedon v. Weedon, 92 Cal.App.2d 367, 369·370 [207 P.2d 
78] ; GosneU v. Webb, 60 Cal.App.2d 1, 3-5 [139 P.2d 985]), 
or a reservation of jurisdiction to make such an order in the 
future, the court cannot, after the interlocutory decree has 
become final, add a provision for alimony or modify the 
amount of payments ordered pursuant to a property settle-
ment agreement. [7] Accordingly, if plaintiff was dissat-
isfied with her contract whereby she had made the support 
and maintenance provisiona an integral part of the settle-
ment of property rights and had tenable grounds for setting 
it aside, she should have attacked the agreement before the 
interlocutory decree was entered. She cannot, however, afte.r 
having secured its approval by the court and having accepted 
the benefits thereof, now seek relief inconsistent with ita terms. 
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(Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d 520, 523-524 [196 P.2d 909]; 
Addms v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621, 627-628 [177 P.2d 265].) 
In support of her motion for an increase in the monthly 
payments, plaintiff filed an uncontradicted affidavit stating 
that under their agreement the parties divided the community 
property equally. She contends that a provision waiving all 
support and maintenance except as is provided in a property 
. settlement agreement is invalid unless it is given in exchange 
for a greater share of the community property than that to 
which the party would otherwise be entitled. Although it 
was that type of agreement that was present in the Adams case, 
the rationale of that decision applies equally to other types 
of integrated bargains. [8] Thus if the wife agreed to 
accept less than her share of the community property in ex-
t change for greater support and maintenance payments, it 
: would be unjust to her subsequently to hold that the payments 
" were alimony subject to reduction on motion of the husband. 
t (See 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, p. 801.) [9] More-
t over, at the time a property settlement is made, the parties 
" t may be uncertain as to which of their property is community 
rather than separate, and they will ordinarily not know how 
. the court in the divorce action will find the facts or how it 
would, in the absence of an acceptable agreement, exercise its 
r discretion in dividing the property and awarding alimony. 
'. The amicable adjustment of these doubtful questions with t respect to the property and support and maintenance rights 
: of the parties may alone supply sufficient consideration to 
: impport their entire agreement. (Bennett v. Bennett, 219 
: Cal. 153, 159 [25 P.2d 426].) Thus in the present case, the 
~ parties recited that they desired to settle their property and 
i support and maintenance rights "by friendly agreement, in-f stead of resorting to court for said purpose." [10] More-
~.'Over, since plaintiff secured her divorce on the ground of 
fextreme cruelty, had the parties not settled their rights by 
I 'agreement, the court could in its discretion have awarded 
/ t"plaintiff all of the community property and less alimony than 
t she received under her agreement. In such case, however. the 
~ ~imony would be subject to reduction in the event of changed 
f~ircumstances. [11] Plaintiff was entitled to agree instead 
~"to an equal division of the community property in exchange 
~ for support and maintenance payments that could not be 
.reduced. Accordin~ly, the fact that the community property i7- divided equally has no bearing :n the validity of the 
) 
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provision of the agreement whereby both parties waived all 
rights to support and maintenance other than as provided 
therein. (Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Ca1.2d 419.420 [240 P.2d 587] ; 
Sasartof/ v. Sasanoff, 120 Cal.App.2d 120, 127 [260 P.2d 
840]; see, also. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 
299 [210 P.2d 750J; Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Cal.App.2d 
44, 45-46 (l79 P.2d 22].) 
[12] Defendant contends that if the payments are not 
subject to modification, the court had no power to order him 
to pay plaintiff's costs and attorney fees on appeal. The trial 
court had jurisdiction, however, to determine in this proceed-
ing the character of the payments involved, and accordingly, 
the divorce action is still pending within the meaning of sec-
tion 137.3 of the Civil Code. (Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 
Ca1.2d 676, 685 [242 P.2d 321] ; Wilson v. Wilson,33 Ca1.2d 
107, 115 [199 P.2d 671].) Since plaintifI did not waive any 
right she might have to attorney fees and costs in her agree-
ment and no abuse of discretion has been shown, the order 
awarding costs and attorney fees on appeal must be aftirmed. 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J .. concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
judgment affirming the orders in this ease but I disagree with 
some of the reasoning leading thereto. 
The trial court here entered its order refusing modification 
of the support provisions incorporated in the interlocutory 
and final decrees of divorce on the ground that it had no 
jurisdiction to modify the amount of the payments. 
Prior to entering its order, the trial court sustained defend-
ant's objection to the introduction of evidence on the ground 
that the rights of the parties were governed by their contract. 
The majority here say that: "The trial court had jurisdic-
tion, however. to determine in this proceeding the character 
of the payments involved. . . ." This is inconsistent with 
its holding that the orders are to be affirmed. If the trial 
court could determine the character of the payments which 
were provided for in the agreement entered into between the 
parties. then it improperly sustained defendant's objection 
to the introduction of evidcnce on that issue. and the case 
should have been re"Vcl"sed. Not only ic; the majority opinion 
in this case inconsistent in itself, but it is inconsistent with 
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the case of Fox v. Fox, post, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881], where 
it was said: "Plaintiff contends, however, that since the pay-
ments were labeled alimony, were to cease on her remarriage, 
and were subject to modification in the event of a reduction 
of defendant's pension, there is evidence to support the trial 
court's implied finding that they were solely alimony subject 
to modification. In the absence of eonf[icting extrinsic e'Vi~ 
dence, the interpretation placed upon the ogreementby the 
trial court is not binding on this court on appetJl . ... n (Em. 
phasis added.) The clear implication from this is that the 
character of the payments is a question of fact to be deter· 
mined by the trial court upon evidence offered by the parties 
for that purpose. It is admitted that "there has been no 
previous adjudication in modification proceedings that the 
monthly payments are alimony. Moreover, the interlocutory 
t"i. decree itself did not purport to determine the character of 
t the payments. It merely ordered defendant to make them 
~. pursuant to the terms of the agreement and thus made clear 
~" that judgment remedies including contempt would be avall-i able for the enforcement of his obligation." 
. With the holding of the majority that this was a property 
settlement agreement entered into between the parties which 
; the court had no power to modify, I agree. It is said that 
~, plaintiff "cannot, however, after having secured its approval 
, by the court and having accepted the benefits thereof, now 
t seek relief inconsistent with its terms." The factual situa· 
t tion here presented shows that the trial court approved the ~. agreement entered into between the parties in its entirety and 
;, ordered that it be performed. It also shows that the support 
!. i provisions for plaintiff were "pursuant to the terms of said 1 agreement" set forth in the interlocutory decree of divorce 
i which was granted to the plaintiff. The rule in such a case 
¥: should be that if the entire agreement is approved by the court i 'and part of its provisions are incorporated in the decree and 
;: ordered to be performed, those portions included in the decree 
I ~ may be enforced by contempt proceedings. The balance of 
/ : the provisions, approved by the court but not incorporated 
in the decree, may be enforced by separate action. It should 
also be the rule that where the terms of a property settlement 
or separation agreement or an agreement for support and 
maintenance have been approved by the court as valid and 
enforceable and incorporated in the decree. the court may 
,not, in that action, or in a later action, modify ita terms and 
y 
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prOVISIons. Once presented to the court, approved by it, in-
corporated in the decree and the performance thereof ordered, 
the parties are bound by their agreement with respect to sup-
port and maintenance, or alimony, as the case may be. 
There are several code provisions (§§ 158, 159, 175) whicb 
all grant to the parties the right to contract with each other. 
In the absence of fraud or overreaching there is no reason 
why a contract providing for support and maintenance should 
not be given the dignity accorded to other contracts. A 
majority of this court accords that dignity to a property settle-
ment agreement which provides for monthly payments but 
holds that the trial court has power to determine the chSlracter 
of the payments. In the present case that statement is a 
non sequitur since the majority sustains the trial court's action 
in refusing to admit evidence concerning the character of the 
payments. Where we disagree is that I believe that once the 
parties have entered into an agreement whether it purports 
to divide the property, or provide for support and maintenance 
payments without a division of the property, which is found 
to be fair and equitable, the subject is forever closed and the 
parties are bound by the terms of their agreement. Incorpora-
tion in the decree has only the effect of making the remedy 
on the judgment and not on the agreement which has become 
merged therein. In the event of lack of incorporation, the 
remedy is on the agreement which should have the same dignity 
as other contracts. 
In these three cases (Dexter v. Dexter, Fox v. Fox, Flynn 
v. Flynn) this court had an opportunity to clarify the law 
so that stability might be given to property settlement agree-
ments and agreements for support and maintenance. Not 
only do the majority holdings in these three cases not settle 
the law, but they add untold confusion. The import of the 
Flynn decision is that an appellate court may order a property 
settlement agreement, which is not even in the record, attached 
to a judgment of divorce after that judgment has become 
final. As I pointed out in my dissent there, there was no 
adequate incorporation and the parties should have resorted 
to an action on the agreement itself for the sum and substance 
of their rights and duties, it having been approved by the 
court in the divorce action. The import of this case is that 
the question of the character of the payments involved in the 
agreement of the parties now merged in the divorce decree is 
a question of fact for the trial court which it may det.ermine 
without any evidence on the subject other than the agreement 
) 
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itself. This result naturally flows from its affirmance of the 
trial court's action in refusing to admit plaintifl"s evidence 
on the subject. The logical inference, of course, to be drawn 
from the action of the trial court is that it impliedly con-
sidered the agreement to be one of property settlement. Then 
we have the Fox case wherein it is said that in the absence 
of conflicting extrinsic evidence the finding of the trial court 
on the character of the payments is not binding on an appel-
late court. If no evidence is necessary, or admissible, then 
this court, or any District Court of Appeal, may make its 
own determination as to the character of the payments agreed 
. upon by and between the spouses to the end that litigation 
. in these matters will be endless and the law on the subject 
.,. will be without any stability whatsoever. As I pointed out in 
my dissent in the Flynn case, how will attorneys know how 
. to advise, or act for, their clients in cases of this kind' The 
: obvious answer is that they will not have the nmotest idea 
fwhether to incorporate the entire agreement in h~c verba, or 
'. in substance, or attach it physically to the decree of divorce 
i or whether, no ·matter how it is done, the trial cooct, or any 
'appellate court will not determine that if mODthly payments 
are provided for those payments constitute alimony subject 
to modification. f· Left open in the majority opinions in all three cases, but 
r there by implication, is whether the parties may contract 
: with each other as to alimony, or support and maintenance, 
r where no property division as such is involved. If the parties 
.:agree on a certain sum to be paid monthly, or annually, or 
·.-emiannually, in lieu of any lump sum provision, that agree-
iinent, if fair and equitable, should have the same stability 
r.as where there has been a division of property by agreement. 
~o far 9.S alimony per Ie is concerned, if the parties cannot 
iL.· .. O ... r for some reason do not themselves reach an amicable agree-
l.~ent on the subject, the trial court has the power to make 
j ~ifuch provision in the decree. In this event, the amount would, 
/ ~f course, be subject to modification under the continuing 
'l:Jurisdiction of the court. Why the parties should not be 
~able to make a binding agreement for the payment of alimony 
for money purely for support and maintenance, is not made 
rclear by the majority. 
l' The majority opinion in each of these cases leaves the 
~1'bvious implication that if such an agreement is incorpo-
l!~ed in the decree, its provisions will be subject to modi1l-
" 
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cation, but if it is not so incorporated. it may not be modified. 
This implication follows from the majority holding that if 
the agr~ment is incorporated. the court bas power to deter-
mine the cbaracter of the payments. that is, whether they are 
for alimony or a part of a property settlement. Why the 
difference' Is not a fair. just and valid agreement to pay 
alimony or support money just as binding as one which also 
contains provisions for a property settlement' Either agree-
ment could provide for its modification under specified condi-
tions. But in the absence of sucb provision it would remain 
unchanged. Why should not such an agreement for alimony 
alone be binding on the court if it is incorporated in the 
decree and approved' 
My position is that if the parties have agreed to a division 
of their property, or for support and maintenance for one 
of them without a property division. and that agreement 
has been approved by the court as fair and equitable, whether 
incorporated in the decree or not. their agreement sets forth 
the full sum of their rights and obligations and may not be 
modified without a subsequent agreement made by them. If 
they have not agreed on support and maintenance, the court 
may, upon application. provide for alimony which is then 
subject to modification under the rules applicable thereto, 
or if they bave not agreed upon a property division the trial 
court may, on trial of the divorce action, divide the property 
of the parties in accord with settled principles of law appli-
cable to the case. 
I would affirm the order refusing modification in this ease 
because the parties had. by their agreement. the pertinent 
provisions of which were incorporated in the decrees of 
divorce and approved by the court as fair and equitable, 
set forth their rights and liabilities. With respect to defend-
ant's appeal from the order granting plaintiff bel' attorneys' 
fees. defendant agreed in the agreement entered into between 
the parties to pay all attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 
plaintiff in any action for divorce which might be filed. The 
agreement contains no waiver on the part of plaintiff as to 
any further attorneys' fees. and the order granting such 
fees should be sustained inasmuch as any allowance therefor 
is discrC't!onRry with the trinl court and there is here no 
claim of abuse of that discretion. 
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